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IS voting for a candidate with no realistic winning chances irresponsible? The question is often practically relevant. For example, in the 2016 Trump/Clinton 
election, Gary Johnson was the Libertarian Party candidate and Jill Stein ran for 
the Greens. Neither Johnson nor Stein had realistic winning chances; together 
they received only around 4 per cent of the vote. If just 70 per cent of those who 
voted for these third- party candidates had voted for Clinton, then she would have 
won.1 In fact, according to some analysis, if only those who voted for Stein had 
voted for Clinton she would have won:
The final totals revealed that, in fact, Stein’s total voters exceeded [the] margin of 
victory. In other words, if every Stein voter had voted for Clinton instead, she could 
have won Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin and the presidency.2
The 2000 Bush/Gore election was, of course, even closer: only a small number 
of third- party voters in Florida could have flipped the election.
The rhetoric around voting for hopeless third- party candidates is often rather 
heated. In the 2016 election, Clinton supporters often argued that while Stein or 
Johnson might make a better president than Clinton, it was self- indulgent and 
morally irresponsible to vote for a candidate with no realistic chances. Stein and 
Johnson voters countered that they had a right to ‘vote their conscience’. A more 
reflective Stein or Johnson voter might add that her vote almost certainly would 
not determine the outcome. If the idea of ‘throwing your vote away’ is cashed out 
in terms of failing to make a difference to the outcome, the objection rests on the 
false presupposition that one could have done that in any event. Moreover, the 
most convincing rationales for voting in massive elections at all seem to entail 
that one ought to vote for whomever one considers best.
1<https://www.wsj.com>.
2<https://www.vox.com/polic y- and- polit ics/2016/11/11/13576 798/jill- stein - third - party - donal d- 
trump - win>.
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For example, if the justification of voting derives from the vague idea that one 
ought to act as one would rationally be willing to see everyone act, then it is not 
hard to see why one ought to vote for hopeless candidates one deems best. After 
all, if everyone voted for that candidate, then that candidate would win, securing 
the best outcome (by one’s own lights). Furthermore, it is plausible that everyone 
following the principle ‘vote for whomever, after due research and deliberation, 
you deem best’ would promote better consequences than everyone following 
principles allowing strategic voting (see below). If, on the other hand, the 
justification for voting in massive elections is, as many theorists have argued, to 
express your political values, then one also ought to vote for the candidate one 
deems best. Voting for a candidate you think is worse and disapprove of would 
be like cheering for a team you want to lose— insincere and pointless.3
Since appeals to universalizability and the rationality of voting as an expressive 
act are two of the leading justifications for voting in such elections, it seems that 
if you should vote at all in such massive elections, then you should vote for 
whomever you consider best, no matter how unlikely they are to win. Each step of 
this argument seems compelling, yet many find its conclusion highly implausible. 
There seems to be something to the worry about throwing your vote away.
here we have the ingredients for a philosophical puzzle. Seemingly plausible 
premises lead to an intuitively problematic conclusion. Nor is this an arcane 
matter. Ordinary citizens agonize about whether they should vote for a candidate 
with no realistic chances. Passions run high, and people are often unclear about 
how even to frame the issue. Of course, it may turn out that we should just follow 
the preceding argument where it leads. Indeed, in one of the few sustained 
discussions of this issue, Paul Meehl argues that one ought to vote one’s conscience 
in this sense, and that worries about ‘throwing your vote away’ are simply 
confused.4 however, Meehl’s discussion is by now dated. Since its publication in 
1977, another powerful and rightly influential account of why one ought to vote 
has been developed: Alvin Goldman’s ‘Causal Responsibility’ approach.5 
Goldman’s is one of the dominant accounts, yet nobody has really asked, much 
less answered, the question of how this theory bears on the ‘throwing your vote 
away’ debate.
In this article, I argue that an account in the vicinity of Goldman’s provides the 
best hope of vindicating something like the ‘don’t throw your vote away’ intuition. 
As it happens, I agree with Carolina Sartorio that Goldman’s own account relies 
3Only typically pointless. You might cheer for a team you do not prefer to thereby express your 
disapproval of the way that others are booing them— out of racism, say. Whether this has a convinc-
ing analogue in the domain of voting for political candidates in huge elections is, however, at best 
unclear.
4Paul Meehl, ‘The selfish voter paradox and the thrown- away vote argument’, American Political 
Science Review, 71 (1977), 11– 30.
5Alvin Goldman, ‘Why citizens should vote: a causal responsibility approach’, Social Philosophy 
and Policy, 16 (1999), 201– 17.
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on a problematic view of causation, but that Sartorio’s friendly amendment to his 
approach nicely accommodates its insights without the problematic metaphysics.6
Finally, a caveat. In this article, I focus on voting systems in which the candidate 
with the largest number of votes wins— sometimes called ‘plurality voting’ systems. 
The puzzle may not arise in other kinds of elections, and some have argued that this 
is, in fact, a reason to prefer such alternative elections— for example, a so- called 
‘instant runoff’ election.7 Although I am sympathetic to this view, I shall not discuss 
it here, but instead focus on the still practical issue of how to think about voting if 
one finds oneself in a plurality- rule system, as many will for the foreseeable future.
I. MEEhL’S ChALLENGE
Our puzzle arises at the intersection of two debates. On the one hand, there is a 
debate about why one ought to vote in massive elections, like a US presidential 
election, at all. It would be an understatement to say that the chances that one 
vote would determine the outcome are minuscule. Nonetheless, people commonly 
characterize voting as obligatory. Slogans like ‘Vote or Die!’ and ‘Rock the Vote!’ 
have considerable currency. Some go so far as to claim that voting is a ‘civic 
sacrament’ and a citizen’s ‘highest obligation’.8 On the other hand, there is a 
debate about whether one should vote for the candidate one deems best when 
they have no realistic winning chances. Some appeal to the intuitive idea that it 
cannot be morally wrong to ‘vote one’s conscience’. Others derisively suggest that 
voting for such candidates is ‘throwing your vote away’. What is unfortunately 
rarely discussed is how these two debates are related. Why one ought to vote may 
have enormous implications for how one ought to vote. In his underappreciated, 
‘The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown- Away Vote Argument’, Paul Meehl 
sets out the following dilemma. In massive elections, either (a) one ought not to 
vote at all, because one’s vote almost certainly will make no difference to the 
outcome, or (b) one ought to vote for whomever one (with adequate information 
and reflection) deems best for the office. Call this ‘Meehl’s challenge’.
The first horn is most easily understood against the backdrop of appeals to 
expected utility. Voting is typically not cost- free; it takes time and effort. I here 
put to one side those who take pleasure in voting for its own sake. Such cases 
are rare, and many of those who take pleasure in voting do so because they think 
they are doing something virtuous for some additional reason. Further, if the only 
reason to vote was that you enjoyed it, then it is unclear why you ought not to 
vote for whomever you deem best anyway.
The costs of voting are not entirely trivial. One must often take time off work 
or find childcare, wait in a queue, and so on. These costs must be weighed against 
6Carolina Sartorio, ‘how to be responsible for something without causing it’, Philosophical 
Perspectives, 18 (2004), 315– 36.
7See especially Daniel Wodak, ‘The expressive case against plurality rule’, Journal of Political 
Philosophy, 27 (2019), 363– 87.
8Christine Pelosi, Campaign Boot Camp 2.0 (San Francisco: Berret- Koehler, 2012), p. 126.
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the benefits. Insofar as the benefits are understood in terms of influencing the 
outcome of the election, the obvious worry is that this is incredibly unlikely. A 
standard way of dealing with decisions made under uncertainty is to maximize 
expected utility. In moral contexts, this means aggregate utility rather than the 
utility of the agent. Expected utility theory and the relevant facts lead quickly to 
the conclusion that most people need not vote in massive elections.9 A prospective 
voter must weigh the near certain and non- negligible costs of voting versus an 
infinitesimally small chance of determining the outcome.
here it is important to recognize just how incredibly minuscule the chances of 
one’s vote determining the election in a US presidential election are. In an analysis 
of the 2008 US presidential election, Andrew Gelman, Nate Silver, and Andrew 
Edlin concluded that the average American’s chances of determining the outcome 
with her vote was around 1 in 60 million. For those in swing states, the odds were 
better, but still extremely long— around 1 in 10 million. For those in ‘safe’ states, 
where one candidate had a very comfortable lead, the odds were far worse— 
around 1 in 1 billion.10 Finally, even if one vote did initially make the difference, 
in the US presidential case any race that close would trigger a recount. The odds 
that the recount would come out exactly the same, with one vote again making 
the difference, would need to be factored into this equation. I am not sure how to 
calculate such odds, but I am also intuitively certain that they fall well short of 
100 per cent.
Despite such breathtakingly long odds, some have argued that one ought to 
vote in massive elections on expected- utility grounds. Derek Parfit notes that 
although the odds are extremely long, the payoffs are also extremely large.11 
Granted, the stakes are very high in US presidential elections. Even so, it is hard 
to believe that the size of these stakes will typically provide a compelling rationale 
for voting in massive elections. First, one might argue that it is simply impractical 
for finite agents like ourselves to maximize expected utility where this includes 
taking into account such incredibly small probabilities. Many of our mundane 
decisions pose infinitesimally small risks of horrible outcomes. If we always had 
to take such incredibly unlikely outcomes into account, deliberation would 
9This basic point is familiar. A classic discussion can be found in Anthony Downs, An Economic 
Theory of Democracy (New York: harper and Row, 1957), ch. 14. See also Goldman, ‘Why citizens 
should vote’; Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky, ‘Large numbers, small costs: the uneasy founda-
tion of democratic rule’, Geoffrey Brennan and Loren Lomasky (eds), Politics and Process: New 
Essays in Democratic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 42– 59; Richard 
Tuck, Free Riding (Cambridge, MA: harvard University Press, 2008); Geoffrey Brennan and Geoffrey 
Sayre- McCord, ‘Voting and causal responsibility’, D. Sobel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Political 
Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), ch. 2. For a recent attempt to justify voting in 
terms of expected utility, see Zach Barnett, ‘Why you should vote to change the outcome’, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, forthcoming.
10Andrew Gelman, Nate Silver, and Andrew Edlin, ‘What is the probability that your vote will 
make a difference?’, NBER working paper 15220 (2009), <http://www.nber.org/paper s/w15220>. 
The correct method for determining these odds is, however, controversial. For a different view and 
discussion of the issues involved, see Barnett, ‘Why you should vote to change the outcome’.
11Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 73– 5.
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become impossible. This does not mean some form of expected utility theory 
cannot play a role as a normative theory of decision- making. Rather, it means 
that this role must be somehow restricted.12 Citizens may therefore legitimately 
ignore the tiny chance that their vote will determine the outcome.
Second, even assuming an entirely unrestricted expected utility theory, the 
rationale for voting in massive elections is dubious. Arguments to the contrary 
tend implicitly to assume that the costs of voting are negligibly small. If we focus 
simply on voting itself, then for many this may be true, though for some these 
costs are significant: for example, the poor and those living overseas. Unfortunately, 
in the 2020 US election many people had to wait in long queues to vote, and this 
may not be the last time this happens. More importantly, though, it is a mistake 
to assume that the relevant costs are exhausted by the costs of voting itself. 
Plausibly, any moral obligation to vote is an obligation to vote responsibly, where 
this involves being suitably well informed and reflective. Someone who votes, but 
without having done any homework on the candidates or reflected on their pros 
and cons, is hardly thereby doing their civic duty. The costs of becoming well 
informed and reflecting adequately are not trivial, particularly in elections with 
several candidates. In the case of a US presidential election, the issues arising are 
numerous and heterogeneous, yet each can be monumentally important. 
Moreover, voters must work out not only whose policy proposals are best in each 
case, but also the relative importance of those policies. The candidates’ track 
record, moral character, likely alliances in Congress, and political skills are also 
relevant.13
Obviously more could be said, but it seems reasonable to presume that the 
costs of responsibly voting in a typical US presidential election are not small. 
Given that these costs are effectively certain if one votes responsibly, the expected 
utility calculation seems unlikely to support responsibly voting. In that case, we 
are not simply weighing the small or nearly negligible costs of just going to the 
polls versus an infinitesimal chance of an extremely good outcome. Instead, we 
must weigh the near certainty of the substantial costs associated with voting 
responsibly against a vanishingly small chance of making the critical difference. 
This seems unlikely to make a compelling case for voting, much less a case so 
strong that we should agree that voting is a sacred duty.
It is therefore no surprise that theorists have developed other accounts of our 
reasons to vote in such elections. here we come to the second horn of Meehl’s 
dilemma, for these theories typically entail that one ought to vote for whichever 
candidate one deems best, no matter their chances. This is perhaps clearest in the 
case of rationales which appeal in some way to the common- sense moral ideal 
encapsulated in the rhetorical question, ‘what if everyone acted like that?’. 
12For a more in- depth defence of this kind of view, see Nicholas Rescher, Risk (Lanham: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 1983). See also the literature on ‘bounded rationality’ and ‘satisficing’.
13See also Jason Brennan, The Ethics of Voting (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) for 
further discussion.
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Anecdotally, many voters appeal to some such moral ideal when pressed. This 
somewhat inchoate common- sense moral appeal to universalization (or 
generalization) can be made precise in multiple ways, and I obviously cannot 
survey all the relevant logical space here.14 Instead I briefly explain why any 
theory in this general area likely entails that one ought to vote for whomever one 
deems best.
Rule- utilitarianism provides one of the most plausible ways of turning this 
common- sense idea into a more precise theory. Rule- utilitarians can argue that 
one ought to vote, even though one’s vote will almost certainly not change the 
outcome, because one ought to follow rules whose general acceptance would 
maximize aggregate utility.15 Plausibly, one such rule would be that one should 
do one’s homework and vote in elections, since otherwise democracy cannot 
function properly. however, the same reasoning suggests that one ought to vote 
for whomever one deems the best. A rule requiring citizens to vote for the best 
would tap into the arguments from ‘deliberative democracy’, according to which 
(roughly) democracy leads to good government because we pool our judgements 
as to what is best.16 This would also avoid two dominant parties preventing the 
emergence of valid alternatives simply because citizens are afraid of ‘throwing 
their vote away’. Obviously more could be said here. One issue is whether rule- 
utilitarianism might warrant conditional rules for dealing with cases in which it 
is clear that certain candidates have no realistic chance of victory.17 Even so, it is 
not hard to see how a rule- utilitarian answer of this sort to the ‘why vote?’ 
challenge might favour voting for candidates with no realistic winning chances.
Kantian ethics offers a very different use of the concept of universalization. 
For the Kantian, the question is not whether everyone’s acting in a certain way 
(or internalizing certain norms) would be desirable. The question is whether 
an agent’s maxim in performing the action is one she could at the same time 
consistently will as a universal law— on the first formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative, anyway. Unfortunately, there is not much literature on how the 
universal law formulation applies to decisions about how to vote (at least, not 
much I could find!). Insofar as the categorical imperative generates a duty to vote, 
it presumably generates a duty to vote for the best candidate. A maxim of voting 
for the best candidate (by one’s own lights) can obviously be willed without any 
sort of contradiction— at least, if there is some looming contradiction, then I 
cannot see what it would be or how it would be derived. This is already enough 
to entail that it is at least permissible to vote for whomever one deems the best 
14For a useful survey, see Marcus Singer, Generalization in Ethics (New York: Atheneum, 1971).
15John harsanyi makes precisely this argument in his classic ‘Rule utilitarianism, rights, obliga-
tions and the theory of rational behavior’, Theory and Decision, 12 (1980), 115– 33.
16Cf. Amy Gutman and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004).
17A thorough discussion of this complex issue would also require some discussion of Donald 
Regan’s ‘cooperative utilitarianism’; see Donald Regan, Utilitarianism and Cooperation (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1980).
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candidate. This would stymie those who argue that it is morally irresponsible to 
vote for hopeless candidates.
In fact, the Kantian framework may entail a duty to vote for whomever one 
deems best. One question is whether a maxim like ‘I shall vote for the candidate 
I deem best unless that candidate has no realistic chance of winning’ can without 
contradiction at the same time be willed as a universal law. Suppose everyone 
adopts this maxim. In that case, how does any individual know how to vote? 
Whether I should vote for A, whom I deem best, will depend in part on how 
everyone else will vote. But the facts about how everyone else will vote are not 
fixed independently of how I will vote. Since others have, given universalization, 
adopted the same maxim, they cannot yet determine for whom they shall vote 
either. Therefore, I cannot vote without knowing how others will vote, but (given 
universalization) how others will vote depends (in part) on how I will vote. Each 
voter will thus be stuck, unable to decide how to vote. Willing such a maxim and 
at the same time willing it as a universal law would thus be self- stultifying. The 
universalization of the maxim would pragmatically contradict the original 
maxim, preventing you from achieving your end of voting. The impermissibility 
of this maxim, in turn, arguably generates a duty to vote for the candidate one 
deems best if one votes at all. how the Kantian then argues that we have a duty 
to vote at all is a further question I will not address here. A lot more would need 
to be said about this derivation of a duty to vote for the best to make it convincing, 
but it would be too much of a tangent to develop a full Kantian theory of voting 
here.18 In any event, the Kantian framework at least vindicates the permissibility 
of voting for politically hopeless candidates, since there is no contradiction in 
willing that maxim as universal. It may entail a duty to vote for whomever one 
considers best.
What about so- called ‘expressive’ theories? On these theories, one should vote 
to express one’s values or preferences. Geoff Brennan and Loren Lomasky 
compare voting with sending a get- well card to a friend or cheering for a team.19 
The example of cheering at a sporting event is apt, since it possible that the 
aggregate of fans cheering could influence the performance of the players in some 
way, even though any individual fan’s cheering would not. The analogy with 
voting in a massive election should be clear. In both cases, it is plausible that one 
acts simply to express one’s values or preferences rather than to determine who 
wins. The expressive theory is not unproblematic. For a start, voting is typically 
done in the privacy of the voting booth and sometimes one is banned from 
sharing a photo or other documentation of how one voted. This does not make 
voting seem like an especially ‘expressive’ act.20 Richard Tuck makes the further 
18At a minimum, a thoroughgoing discussion of how to apply Kant’s theory would require inves-
tigating how the other formulations of the categorical imperative apply here.
19Brennan and Lomasky, ‘Large numbers, small costs’, p. 49.
20Granted, some sports fans cheer in the privacy of their home. If this is the right model for the 
expressive theory, then ‘express’ cannot plausibly be understood in terms of communication, but as 
venting.
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point that the expressive rationale is parasitic on the idea that one’s vote influences 
the outcome:
even if the act of voting does express something like civic allegiance, it does so 
precisely because it is widely thought to have some civic point, that is to have some 
instrumental or causal relationship to the choice of a candidate.21
Fortunately, I do not here need to assess the tenability of the expressive 
theory. The relevant point is simpler. Insofar as one’s voting is justified in terms 
of expressing your values and preferences, then obviously you should vote for 
whomever you take to be the best candidate. To vote for a candidate you deem 
inferior is like cheering for a team you want to lose.
Yet another account of our reasons to vote is Alexander Guerrero’s ‘Manifest 
Normative Mandate’ (MNM) account.22 I lack the space here to do justice to 
Guerrero’s theory, but the basic idea is that you should vote to increase the moral 
authority or ‘manifest normative mandate’ that your preferred candidate has for 
acting as a trustee (rather than as a delegate), where a delegate ought to be guided 
more by what a majority of their constituents want, but a trustee should be more 
guided by their own judgement of what is best for their constituents, even when 
this contradicts what a majority of them want. It would be too much of a tangent 
to explain why Guerrero thinks we should often prefer to elect candidates as 
trustees rather than as delegates, but assuming we should, he thinks we should 
want those candidates, if elected, to have a solid moral justification for acting as 
trustees. here he argues that their having such a justification varies directly with 
their manifest normative mandate (MNM), which itself varies directly with how 
many votes they garnered. By voting, you increase the MNM, if only a tiny bit, of 
your preferred candidate, and that provides you with a reason to vote.
There are many objections one could raise to this approach (several discussed 
by Guerrero in his article), but the issue here is what implications the theory has 
when it comes to voting for unrealistic candidates. Fortunately, in this case, we do 
not have to speculate; Guerrero explains the implications of his view. We should 
typically vote for whomever we deem best, even if they have no hope of winning:
Shouldn’t an individual vote for the least bad ‘viable’ candidate? The normative 
mandate account suggests that there is in fact a significant reason against doing so. 
For similar reasons that one ought to want candidates one supports to govern like 
trustees, one ought to want candidates whom one does not support to govern like 
delegates. In saying this, I am assuming that representatives respond to their MNM 
in the way I have argued is morally appropriate. If this is not the case, there may be 
other considerations that tell in favor of voting for the candidate who one thinks is 
less bad. These considerations, however, must take into account the fact that it is 
incredibly unlikely that one’s vote will make a difference to who wins the election. 
21Tuck, Free Riding, pp. 33– 4.
22Alexander Guerrero, ‘The paradox of voting and the ethics of political representation’, 
Philosophy and Public Affairs, 38 (2010), 272– 306.
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And one such consideration cannot be that by voting for the lesser of two evils, one 
‘weakens’ the MNM of the greater evil. One ‘weakens’ the MNM of the worse 
candidate by whatever one does as long as one does not vote for that candidate. And 
there is at least this consideration against voting for the less evil candidate: doing so 
strengthens the MNM of a candidate— by one additional vote— who you believe is 
unworthy of this support.23
So once again, we have a theory of why one should vote which cannot vindicate 
the worry that one should not ‘throw one’s vote away’.
By now, it should be clear why Meehl’s challenge is powerful. however, 
Meehl’s article was written before Alvin Goldman developed his causal 
responsibility account of why one ought to vote. It turns out that this theory 
has more resources to vindicate the thought that one ought not ‘throw one’s 
vote away’. Whether the theory ultimately can justify this view depends on 
subtle questions about how praiseworthiness and blameworthiness ‘trickle 
down’ from groups to their members, or so I shall argue. First, I must simply 
lay out the theory.
II. ThE CAUSAL RESPONSIBILITY APPROACh
The basic ideas of Goldman’s ‘causal responsibility approach’ are straightforward:
1. Non- swing voters in a massive election make causal contributions. 
Although it is not true that if they had not voted as they did that 
the outcome would have differed, their vote still has a causal influence.
2. Voting for a candidate means you make a greater causal contribution to his or 
her election than abstaining, while voting for an opponent would make a causal 
contribution with the opposite valence.
3. If someone plays this sort of causal role for the right reason then, ceteris paribus, 
they are apt for praise or blame depending on how they voted and the outcome.
4. That you would be praiseworthy is a good reason for acting; that you would 
otherwise be blameworthy is also a good reason for acting.
Goldman argues for each of these theses. I cannot do justice to his discussion 
here, but one example he uses to motivate (1) is a firing squad. It may be true 
of each member of the firing squad that if he had not fired the target would still 
have been killed. It seems perverse to infer from this that no member of the firing 
squad is causally responsible for the target’s death. Once we accept (1), (2) is 
very plausible. It is intuitively plausible that if you knowingly choose to play a 
causal role in bringing about a good outcome, you are thereby to some extent 
praiseworthy, whereas if you knowingly play a causal role in bringing about a 
bad outcome, you are to some extent blameworthy. The firing squad example 
again makes the point nicely. We do not think each member of an unjust firing 
squad is exculpated because no one of their actions was necessary for the victim’s 
23Ibid., p. 301.
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death. Finally, it is at least somewhat plausible that we have reason to avoid 
blameworthiness and seek praiseworthiness.
Goldman draws on these ideas to develop a dominance argument. Suppose 
you abstain and the better candidate wins. In that case, you missed an opportunity 
to do something praiseworthy by voting for the winner. Suppose instead that you 
abstain and the better candidate loses. In that case, you are blameworthy, 
according to Goldman. here things are trickier, though; Goldman does not think 
that abstaining is a cause of anyone’s victory. he defends a ‘vectoral model’ in 
which the causes of the winner’s victory are the votes he receives. however, on 
Goldman’s view, an abstention by someone who was eligible to vote does still 
open one up to a charge of ‘causal responsibility’, in that the agent had an option 
which could have been a countervailing casual factor.24
Goldman’s account has several attractions. First, it does not rely on the 
delusional idea that voting in massive elections is likely enough to determine the 
outcome to justify voting in terms of expected utility. Second, unlike rule- 
utilitarian and Kantian accounts of why one ought to vote, Goldman’s theory is 
neutral between a wide range of first- order moral theories. Third, the account 
resonates with the actual moral psychology of voters. Voters often seem to value 
being part of something both valuable and ‘bigger than themselves’. Politicians 
play on this, encouraging voters to be ‘part of the change’, and so on.25
At the same time, Goldman’s theory is open to several objections. One objection 
I mostly put to one side here is that there is something narcissistic about voting 
to be praiseworthy or avoid blameworthiness. Someone who is kind to others not 
out of empathy, but to be praiseworthy, seems to be doing the right thing for the 
wrong reason. I cannot do justice to this objection here, but it is certainly not 
obviously decisive. On some accounts, wrongness just is blameworthiness, and it 
is not obviously problematic to be motivated by a desire to avoid acting wrongly.26 
It is also not obvious that on an account like Goldman’s the agent’s reason must 
be that acting otherwise would make her blameworthy. Perhaps the reason could 
be ‘that I thereby avoid complicity with evil’ or something along those lines.
Another objection is that Goldman’s argument relies on a problematic view of 
causation. This point was made effectively by Carolina Sartorio.27 Oversimplifying, 
Sartorio argues that Goldman commits the fallacy of division— inferring that 
some proper part has some property because the whole of which it is a part has 
it. This inference is not generally valid. The property of weighing more than five 
pounds is a clear counter- example. Sartorio’s suggestion is that the property of 
causing some event is relevantly like weighing more than five pounds, and that 
this vitiates Goldman’s account. The fact that some group of voters together 
24Goldman, ‘Why citizens should vote’, p. 211.
25E.g. Andy Burnham (UK Labour) used the slogan ‘Be Part of the Change’; <https://www.thegu 
ardian.com/polit ics/2015/aug/31/andy- burnh am- makes - a- pitch - for- labou rs- leftw ing- vote>.
26John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), ch. 5.
27Sartorio, ‘how to be responsible for something without causing it’.
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brought about some outcome by acting in a certain way together does not entail 
that any individual was thereby a cause of the outcome. One nice example 
Sartorio uses is someone’s failing to clap causing someone to think she was rude. 
Failing to clap is partly constituted by not moving one’s left hand a certain way 
and partly constituted by one’s not moving one’s right hand a certain way. The 
person’s failure to move both their left and right hand together simultaneously in 
the right way causes the other person to think they are rude, but it would be a 
mistake to infer that the mere failure to move the left hand in the relevant way 
was a cause of the belief that the person was rude. Insofar as we treat joint 
actions involving multiple agents on a par with the proper parts of actions of 
individual agents, this undermines Goldman’s account.
I have not done anything like full justice to Sartorio’s argument. She also uses 
ingenious examples to argue that Goldman’s approach absurdly implies that 
virtually any omission is a cause of virtually any outcome it temporally precedes. 
Sartorio also offers a positive theory which preserves what is insightful about 
Goldman’s approach without its tendentious view of causation. Causation is 
still relevant on Sartorio’s view, but an agent can be responsible for an outcome 
without her action having been among its causes. Rather, the agent must be at 
least partly morally responsible for something which caused the outcome. As 
she puts it, causation is the vehicle of transmission of responsibility. Although 
she does not entirely spell this out explicitly, the idea seems to be that when an 
agent’s action (or omission) is a proper part of some joint action (or omission), 
and where certain other conditions are met (for example, the agent knows that 
her action will partly constitute this joint action/omission and could have done 
otherwise), the agent is thereby partly morally responsible for the relevant joint 
action/omission. We do not have to suppose that the agent caused that joint 
action, though; it is enough that she knowingly partly constituted it.
Sartorio suggests that this view can accommodate our intuitions in the examples 
Goldman used to motivate his own approach. For example, it can explain why 
someone who is a member of a firing squad and who unjustly shoots someone 
is thereby blameworthy. Such a person is partly responsible for a joint action 
which causes the victim’s death, and the other conditions are met, so the person 
is blameworthy. For the same sorts of reasons, her account can also explain why 
people have reason to vote in massive elections. In voting for the best candidate, 
one’s action partly constitutes a joint action which causes something good if that 
candidate wins, and one is thereby praiseworthy— assuming the other conditions 
are met. In abstaining when enough people abstained who would have voted 
for the better candidate if they had voted, one’s omission partly constitutes a 
collective omission— we, the abstainers, together didn’t bother to vote. This 
collective omission plausibly was a cause of the worse candidate winning, so one 
is thereby blameworthy, again assuming the other needed conditions are met. We 
have a dominance argument for voting with the same structure as Goldman’s 
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argument. Voting insulates us from blame if the worse candidate wins and makes 
us praiseworthy if the better candidate wins.
III. INTRODUCING DIVISIBILITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
With Sartorio’s account in view, we can now return to elections in which the 
candidate a given voter deems best, after due research and reflection, has no 
realistic chance of winning. To simplify, I stipulate that we have a massive election 
between three candidates: horrible, Acceptable, and Great. Our hypothetical 
voter, Ken,28 has decided on reflection that horrible’s election would be disastrous, 
Acceptable’s election would be mediocre, while Great’s election would be 
fantastic. however, while both horrible and Acceptable have decent chances of 
winning the election, Great has no realistic winning chances, given the polls. I 
stipulate that Great’s levels of support are comparable to Jill Stein’s level of 
support in the 2016 presidential election— between 1 and 2 per cent of likely 
voters. Ken has read Goldman and Sartorio, and is convinced by the latter’s 
rationale for voting. how should Ken vote?
I initially make the idealizing assumption that no eligible voter abstains. I 
also initially assume that all voters vote for one of the three candidates on the 
ballot— that the system does not allow write- ins. Finally, I initially make the 
idealizing assumption that those who vote for Acceptable because they think 
Acceptable is actually the best candidate are culpable for their incorrect ranking 
of the candidates; I assume they should know better. I relax these idealizing 
assumptions later.
Consider the following hypothetical dialogue:
Hillary: Ken, I have a bone to pick with you. I understand you are voting for Great. 
You know Great has no chance of winning; why would you throw your vote away?
Ken: Well, my vote won’t make the crucial difference in any event; millions of people 
are voting! So if the idea is that by voting for a major party candidate, I would not 
throw my vote away, that I’d therefore be more likely to ‘make a difference’, then 
the chances of that are so low as to be irrelevant. Anyway, I am tempted to vote for 
Great because in the unlikely event that Great wins, then I will have helped her win, 
and helping to cause something good is praiseworthy. have you read this article by 
Sartorio?
Hillary: Yes, yes, but that isn’t much of a reason, since the odds of Great winning 
are incredibly slim.
Ken: It is a long shot, I agree, but it isn’t just about who wins this election. It is also 
important to send a message to the mainstream parties that their values are out 
of synch with lots of voters. If enough of us vote for Great, then that should be a 
28So named as a homage to the legendary swing voter Ken Bone, in the 2016 US presidential election; 
<https://www.editi on.cnn.com/inter activ e/2017/polit ics/state/ ken- bone- undec ided- voter - donal d- trump/>.
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wake- up call, and should in the longer term move politics in this country in a good 
direction. If I am part of the group that ‘sends that message’, then I will to some 
extent be praiseworthy for that too, given Sartorio’s account. Enough of us voting to 
send a message isn’t such a long shot. If that happens, then I’ll be partly responsible 
for the joint action (our voting for Great) which sends that very important message 
and thus praiseworthy.
Hillary: OK; that is a better reason. But you have to look at the reasons on both sides 
of the ledger— what if horrible wins? If you vote for Great and then horrible wins, 
you will be partially responsible for horrible’s victory. After all, the race between 
horrible and Acceptable is very close, and if all those planning to vote for Great 
were to vote for Acceptable, then Acceptable would win and horrible would lose. 
By the logic of Sartorio’s argument, you’d be partly responsible for a joint action 
(our voting for Great) which caused something horrible, and you’d be blameworthy 
for that. If all the Great voters were to vote for Acceptable, then Acceptable would 
win and horrible would lose; the decision to not vote for Acceptable is therefore 
unacceptable! The stakes are too high for you to vote for Great to send a message; 
you risk being blameworthy for something worse than politics as usual.
Jill: Sorry, hillary, that argument just doesn’t work. You can use exactly the same 
form of argument to show that those who vote for Acceptable will be blameworthy 
for horrible’s victory if he wins. After all, if all those who voted for Acceptable had 
voted for Great, then Great would have won too! That pool of voters would provide 
a majority regardless of whether it is a majority for Acceptable or for Great. So if 
you vote for Acceptable, you are partly responsible for a joint action (our voting 
for Acceptable rather than Great) which also predictably leads to horrible’s victory. 
You see an asymmetry here where in fact the actions are on a par. So, go ahead, Ken, 
vote for Great and send that signal!
Hillary: hmm. There is something fishy about that, Jill, but I am not sure what. 
It sure seems like Great voters would be more blameworthy for a horrible victory 
than Acceptable voters would be. however, I can’t see why this should be true, since 
if either group of voters all voted for the other candidate, then that candidate would 
defeat horrible.
Jill: In fact, the case for voting for Great is even stronger. If you vote for Acceptable 
and Acceptable wins, you are still not off the hook morally. For in that case, you 
are still at least partly responsible for a joint action (our voting for Acceptable) 
which non- accidentally led to Great’s defeat and Great is, by hypothesis, better than 
Acceptable. If all those Acceptable voters had voted for Great, then Great would 
have won. So not only does hillary’s argument for voting for Acceptable not work, 
you (Ken) have left out another reason to vote for Great— you thereby insulate 
yourself from blameworthiness for Great’s defeat. If you vote for Acceptable and 
Acceptable wins, you are thereby partly blameworthy for Great’s defeat. So, on any 
of the three possible outcomes, you should vote for Great!
Ken: I’m more confused than ever now!
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Given this dialogue, it seems we still cannot meet Meehl’s challenge, even given 
a Sartorio/Goldman- style theory. In fact, matters are more complicated. hillary’s 
intuition that Great voters would be more culpable for a horrible victory than 
Acceptable voters can be vindicated within the causal responsibility framework if, 
but only if, we assume joint moral responsibility is in a sense divisible. Plausibly, 
moral responsibility is a scalar notion— it comes in degrees. The USA is more 
responsible for climate change than Ghana. George Bush is more responsible 
for the war in Iraq than Tony Blair. If responsibility comes in degrees, though, 
how responsible is an individual voter for an outcome she only partly caused (on 
Goldman’s view) or for which she is responsible only in virtue of being one small 
part of a large group who together caused that outcome (on Sartorio’s view)? 
Sartorio does not discuss this question, and Goldman mentions it only to put it 
to one side:
how is moral credit to be divided when there are more than enough contributors to 
a socially valuable outcome? It would be nice to have answers to these further 
questions, but I do not have them.29
To be fair, this is not a problem for Goldman or Sartorio, given their aim 
of simply providing a rationale for voting at all. For present purposes, though, 
this question is of paramount importance. hillary’s intuition is that Great 
voters would somehow be more responsible for a horrible victory if horrible 
won than Acceptable voters would be. This is a very natural intuition to have. 
Indeed, I suspect that something like it is at the heart of the ‘throw your vote 
away’ intuition. It turns out that on one prima facie plausible way of thinking 
about how moral responsibility is transmitted from groups to their members, 
hillary’s intuition is potentially sound, but on another prima facie plausible way 
of thinking about that transmission, the intuition is not sound.
here are two views one might take about the transmission of moral 
responsibility of groups to their members:
Indivisible. All else being equal, when a group of people act together to bring about 
some outcome, such that the members of that group are thereby morally responsible 
for that outcome, each member is fully responsible for the outcome.
Divisible. All else being equal, when a group of people act together to bring about 
some outcome, such that the members of that group are thereby morally responsible 
for that outcome, each member is only partly responsible for that outcome.
Those who accept Divisible will probably also find the following corollary 
plausible:
29Goldman, ‘Why citizens should vote’, p. 214.
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Proportional. When a group of people act together to bring about some outcome, 
such that the members of that group are thereby morally responsible for that 
outcome, each member’s moral responsibility is, all else being equal, proportional to 
her contribution to the outcome.
Given Proportional, someone who not only votes for a candidate, but also 
makes large campaign donations and convinces many others to vote will typically 
bear more moral responsibility for the outcome in question than someone who 
merely votes for that candidate. To further simplify matters, I am putting to one 
side these other ways in which one might promote a given candidate’s victory.
If Indivisible is correct, then the dominance argument Jill made in my dialogue 
above for voting for Great goes through, and Meehl’s challenge remains unmet. 
In that case, there is simply no justification for the idea that Great voters are 
more culpable for horrible’s victory than Acceptable voters are. Since both 
groups could have acted differently, with Acceptable voters all switching to Great 
and vice versa for Great voters, both groups are responsible for not preventing 
horrible’s victory. Insofar as responsibility is indivisible, as Indivisible asserts, 
the members of each group are thereby fully responsible for that outcome— and 
hence are all equally responsible for it. Since the only hope for vindicating the 
‘don’t throw your vote away’ intuition was to find some basis for the idea that 
Great voters are more responsible for horrible’s victory (if horrible wins) than 
Acceptable voters, the intuition seems hopeless if we accept Indivisible.
Things are more interesting if we accept Divisible and Proportional. here we 
need to be careful, though, and distinguish two different objects of responsibility. 
On the one hand, it is plausible that if horrible wins, then horrible voters are 
responsible for directly and deliberately bringing about that victory. On the other 
hand, it is plausible that Great and Acceptable voters are not responsible for this, 
as they tried to elect someone else. Rather, they are responsible for not preventing 
the horrible voters from electing horrible. This is an important distinction. It 
helps explain why we think horrible voters are more blameworthy than either 
Great voters or Acceptable voters. It is not, as Goldman’s discussion indicates, that 
horrible supporters play a larger causal role in bringing about that outcome— at 
least, it is not primarily that, though that might also matter. Rather, it is that it 
is in general worse to deliberately bring about some outcome than it is to fail to 
prevent someone else from bringing about that outcome at some cost to oneself. 
Murderers are more culpable than bystanders who could, at some risk, have 
prevented their murders.
The crucial question is whether, given Divisible and Proportional, Great voters 
are more culpable for not preventing horrible voters from electing horrible than 
Acceptable voters. We can concede to Jill that both groups are responsible, since 
if all the members of either group had supported the other candidate then, by 
hypothesis, that candidate would have had a majority and defeated horrible. 
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however, given Divisible and Proportional, it does not follow that the members 
of those groups are equally culpable. here it helps to supply some numbers.
Suppose the vote turned out like this, and that something roughly like this was 
predictable in advance, given polls, and so on:
horrible: 10 million votes
Great: 2 million votes
Acceptable: 9 million votes
Great voters could have all voted for Acceptable, and then Acceptable would 
have won. They are, to that extent, culpable for horrible’s victory. how culpable is 
any one Great voter? Since there were 2 million Great voters, the simplest answer 
would seem to be that each of them bears one 2- millionth of the culpability for 
their not preventing horrible’s victory. Of course, it was only necessary for just 
over 1 million of the Great Voters to switch to Acceptable, so one could argue 
that each Great voter bears (just over) one 1- millionth of the culpability for not 
preventing horrible’s victory. I prefer the first form of moral accounting, but 
fortunately which of these views we take will not matter for present purposes. 
The upshot is that a given Great voter bears either one 2- millionth or just over 
one 1- millionth of the culpability for their joint failure to prevent horrible’s 
victory when they (together) could have prevented it.
Now compare this with the accountability of an individual Acceptable 
Voter. By the same logic, each Acceptable voter bears either one 9- millionth of 
the responsibility for their failing to prevent horrible’s victory or just over one 
8- millionth of the culpability for their failing to prevent horrible’s victory. Note 
that these are shares of accountability for a different joint action (our supporting 
Great versus our supporting Acceptable), so there is no double- counting here. 
In effect, there were two groups, each of which could have, with the help of the 
other group, prevented horrible’s victory. Structurally, the case is analogous to 
one in which two individuals could have prevented some fiend from committing 
a crime— instead of two individuals, we have two groups.
By now it is perhaps clear where I am going with this. One 2- millionth and 
[just over] one 1- millionth are both greater— indeed, much greater— than one 
9- millionth or just over one 8- millionth. The upshot is that Great voters are about 
eight or nine times more culpable for horrible’s victory than Acceptable voters. 
This, though, was precisely the intuition needing vindication, and just the sort of 
difference we need to make sense of the ‘don’t throw your vote away’ intuition. 
To be clear, even if all of this is conceded, it is not obvious that Great voters have 
acted wrongly. After all, the reasons mentioned above are still reasons for voting 
for Great— the tiny chance of being partially praiseworthy for a Great victory, the 
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much better chance of being partially praiseworthy for ‘sending a message’, and 
avoiding blameworthiness for Great’s defeat are all still reasons to be weighed.
If, however, the gap between horrible and Acceptable is much greater than the 
gap between Acceptable and Great, then these reasons may well be outweighed 
by the risk of being (eight to nine times) more culpable for horrible’s victory than 
they would be if they had voted for Acceptable. The overall balance of reasons 
will also presumably depend on how likely it is that horrible will win. If the 
chances of a horrible victory are extremely low, then the risk of much greater 
culpability for his victory is also low, which would diminish the force of the case 
for voting for Acceptable. This, though, is a welcome result. The lower the risk 
of a horrible victory, the more intuitively plausible it is that it is permissible to 
vote for Great. Clinton supporters, for example, would have probably been less 
passionate about progressives not ‘throwing their votes away’ on the Green Party 
if they were virtually certain Trump would lose anyway.
I now relax the idealizing assumption that none of the eligible voters abstains. 
Suppose that many voters abstain and the numbers come out as follows:
horrible: 10 million votes
Great: 2 million votes
Acceptable: 9 million votes
Abstained: 14 million
how does the Sartorio approach apply here? Again, we should put to one side 
those who voted for horrible, as they are responsible for something worse than 
any of the other voters— deliberately electing horrible. By contrast, the remaining 
voters are, at most, responsible for the lesser moral offence of not preventing 
the horrible voters from electing horrible. how, though, do we apportion their 
responsibility in this case (once again assuming Divisible and Proportional)?
There are 25 million voters who did not vote for horrible. Only 2 million voted 
for Great. If just over 8 million of the remaining voters had voted for Great, and 
the rest did not vote for horrible, then Great would have won. however, there is 
no particular proper subset of the remaining voters who are especially responsible 
for not preventing horrible’s victory by electing Great. It would be arbitrary to 
select just over 8 million of the remaining 23 million voters and insist that they, 
but not the other 15 million, are responsible for not electing Great. To avoid such 
arbitrary distinctions, we should instead hold all 23 million responsible. Given 
Proportional, that means each member of that group bears one 23- millionth of 
the culpability for not electing Great. By parity of reasoning, the 16 million voters 
who did not vote for horrible, but also did not vote for Acceptable either, each 
bear one 16- millionth of the responsibility for not preventing horrible’s victory 
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by electing Acceptable. Since one 16- millionth is greater than one 23- millionth, 
those who voted for Great are more culpable for failing to prevent horrible’s 
victory than those who voted for Acceptable. Including those who abstained 
makes things more complicated, but the same form of argument still works.
One nice feature of this analysis is that those who abstain are more culpable 
than those who voted for Great and those who voted for Acceptable. For those 
who abstained bear some culpability for both the non- election of Great and the 
non- election of Acceptable. Whereas those who voted for at least one of those 
two candidates avoid culpability for at least one of these. This accords with pre- 
theoretical intuition, which condemns those who don’t vote as failing to carry 
out their civic duty. Those who do not bother to vote at all are more irresponsible 
than those who voted for either Acceptable or Great. Whether they are also more 
blameworthy than those who voted for horrible may depend on just how bad 
horrible is, and how apparent that badness should have been to anyone who 
did due research, and so on. Those who voted for horrible with the sincere but 
misguided belief that horrible was best will be open to moral censure insofar as 
they should have known better. At the same time, many such voters did at least 
try to carry out their civic duty, so to that extent we may reasonably think better 
of them than those who abstained. Still, if horrible is bad enough and this is 
obvious enough, those who voted for horrible will be more blameworthy than 
those who abstained.
There is a sense in which the analysis I have offered takes the relevant groups 
to be maximally inclusive. Putting horrible voters to one side, I suggested that we 
include all those eligible voters who did not vote for Great when thinking about 
who is responsible, and to what degree, for Great’s non- election, and mutatis 
mutandis for Acceptable’s non- election. I suggested that this was justified because 
focusing on any proper subset of those people is arbitrary. This, though, leads 
to an objection. Why not include all the various groups who could have made 
the difference? In addition to the group composed of all the 16 million (non- 
horrible) voters who did not vote for Acceptable, there is the group composed 
of all of those (non- horrible voters) who did not vote for Acceptable and had a 
last name which began with a letter before M, and the group composed of all the 
(non- horrible) voters who did not vote for Acceptable and had a zip- code whose 
last digit was odd. We could, after all, hold that these groups are responsible.
The problem with this wider approach is that it massively overestimates the 
responsibility of individuals. Any individual in the set of (non- horrible) voters 
who did not vote for Acceptable will belong to a staggeringly large number of 
groups, each of which is a proper subset of that set which is large enough to 
have made the difference if they had voted for Acceptable. Of course, we could 
hold that each of those proper subsets is only partially responsible for the bad 
outcome, but it is not clear how we could apportion that accountability in a 
principled manner.
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Moreover, this is clearly not how we think about more familiar cases with the 
same structure. Consider the following thought experiment:
Lifting. A heavy object is slowly crushing someone to death on the beach. Several 
people are trying to save him by lifting the object, but those who are trying lack the 
collective strength to lift it. Several hundred other people are sunbathing nearby. If 
ten of these sunbathers helped lift the object, then the victim could be saved. Despite 
the pleas for help from those lifting the object, none of these people lifts a finger. The 
victim is crushed to death.
Intuitively, we would hold each of those who did not help responsible for 
the victim’s death. There would be no intuitive support for focusing on the huge 
number of smaller groups of ten, each of which could have helped, assuming 
that all of those are equally well suited to the job. I am here putting to one side 
difference in abilities and differences arising from social roles (a lifeguard is more 
culpable than a sunbather).
however, thinking about this kind of example suggests another objection. 
Proportional is crucial to the proffered defence of the ‘don’t throw your vote 
away’ intuition. It is only because each individual’s culpability for some group 
crime is systematically inversely proportional to the total number of members 
of that group that the argument works— the point being that the group that 
voted for the unrealistic candidate will unsurprisingly be much smaller than the 
group that voted for the candidate with realistic winning chances. There are, 
of course, indefinitely many mathematical functions which can secure inverse 
proportionality of some form or other. however, it is not obvious how any 
mathematical function other than one which assigns equal shares of responsibility 
to each voter (all else equal) has intuitive support.
One worry I cannot address in detail here is that this approach seems to 
countenance a problematic form of moral luck. After all, it is a matter of luck 
which candidate wins, and someone who votes for the wrong candidate will 
be less blameworthy if that candidate loses than she would have been if that 
candidate had won. This can seem unjust, since the moral quality of the agent’s 
will does not differ. This, though, is a familiar problem for many theories of moral 
responsibility and indeed common- sense morality. Such distinctions are part of 
ordinary practice, insofar as we both morally and legally distinguish attempted 
misdeeds from successful ones. To some extent, then, this is ‘everyone’s problem’ 
and there is no obvious reason to think the moral luck countenanced here is any 
more troubling than the way in which we distinguish homicide from attempted 
homicide. I shall, however, note one possible way of mitigating the worry about 
moral luck specific to this context.
What I have in mind is the possibility of an appeal to the voter’s expected 
culpability. So long as the voter was ex ante epistemically responsible in assessing 
the candidates’ actual merits, and roughly estimating the expected culpability 
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associated with each of their possible votes, if they then vote such that their 
expected culpability is minimized, they have acted responsibly. The idea would 
be that having voted responsibly in this sense offers a kind of excuse, so that one 
will not actually be culpable even if one’s expectations turn out to have been 
incorrect. Strictly speaking, then, the theory would need to be couched in terms of 
expected prima facie culpability, since someone with an excuse will not actually 
be culpable, all things considered. Since what it is rational for a voter to think the 
expected culpability of her various options is when she votes is not dependent on 
how things actually turn out in the election, this approach insulates the theory 
from the worry about moral luck. On the other hand, it does impose yet more 
burdens on citizens when voting, and it might thus make our civic duties ‘too 
demanding’. I lack the space here to explore this line of argument in the detail it 
deserves. here I simply plead that I am only tracing out the implications of the 
Goldman/Sartorio approach for the ‘don’t throw your vote away’ debate, rather 
than actually defending that theory itself.
IV. VINDICATING DIVISIBILITY AND PROPORTIONALITY
I have offered a modest and conditional defence of the ‘don’t throw your vote 
away’ intuition. The defence is modest and conditional in part because it just 
assumes that something like Goldman’s or Sartorio’s theory provides a good 
rationale for voting. however, the defence also assumes that Divisible and 
Proportional are both true. Are they?
Neither common- sense morality nor legal practice offers a simple verdict on 
Divisible and Proportional. In some cases, common sense firmly rejects Divisible. 
For example, suppose several people plot together to murder someone, and act in 
concert to kill that person by shooting him simultaneously as a firing squad. In 
that scenario, common- sense morality tends to view each member as fully liable 
for murder, rather than each bearing only 1/n of the responsibility for the murder, 
where n equals the size of the group. Even here matters are complicated, since it 
might be that one bullet actually caused the person’s death, and that might matter. 
The law has taken different views at different times. At one point, English law 
distinguished the accomplice who merely drove the car from the trigger man, 
allowing the former, but not the latter, to avail themselves of the defence of duress 
(murder is generally considered such a vile crime that duress is no defence). 
English courts later abandoned this distinction. In Abbott vs The Queen, the 
defendant held the victim down while she was repeatedly skewered with a sabre, 
and the court held that the causal contribution of the accomplice was not so 
different from that of the person doing the stabbing and refused the defence of 
duress to both.30 In a case in which the person’s death is caused only by the 
30The case is discussed by Michael Moore in his ‘Causation and responsibility’, Social Philosophy 
and Policy, 16 (1999), 1– 51, at p. 14. The case is Abbot vs The Queen [1976- 3], All Eng. L. Rep. 140.
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aggregate of all the shootings, we intuitively do not take the perpetrators’ 
culpability to be diminished. Divisible and Proportional therefore seem not to 
hold in such cases. In general, common law rejects apportioned liability too.31
In other cases, common- sense morality and legal practice endorse Divisible 
and Proportional. Interestingly, common- sense morality seems most clearly 
sympathetic to these doctrines in cases involving praiseworthiness rather than 
blameworthiness. It is commonplace for people discussing team sports to 
emphasize that no one player ‘deserves all the credit’ for the team’s success, a 
form of words which at least strongly suggests that praiseworthiness is a finite 
good which is divided among the players in proportion to their relative 
contribution. Other cases make this even clearer. Someone who makes a huge 
contribution to a worthy charity, ‘Kickstarter’ campaign, or beggar deserves more 
praise than someone who donates only pennies, even when the latter is part of a 
group who together donate just as much. Some areas of legal practice also favour 
Divisible and Proportional. The idea of apportioned liability is most common in 
cases of strict liability, but it can also be found in some areas of anti- trust and 
securities.32 Interestingly, the law tracks a distinction between negligence, 
accidents, mistakes, or other unintentional violations of the law on the one hand, 
and deliberate criminal activity on the other, allowing apportioned liability in the 
former, but not the latter.33
Are common- sense morality and legal practice simply an arbitrary hodgepodge? 
No; it is not that hard to find a pragmatic rationale for these distinctions. Allowing 
for apportioned liability in the case of deliberate wrongdoing or criminal activity 
would generate a very problematic perverse incentive. Suppose you are thinking 
about committing a crime or doing something immoral for personal gain. If 
criminal sanctions or informal blame were divided between those who together 
commit such actions, then you would have a strong incentive to get enough 
other people to commit the misdeed in question with you, as a group. If the 
group is large enough, then the criminal sanctions or informal blame would be so 
diluted as to be negligible. This pragmatic argument does not work in the case of 
praiseworthiness. In that case, we might want to encourage people to compete to 
be more praiseworthy, and apportioning praiseworthiness is tailormade for this. 
Finally, the worry about perverse incentives is less pronounced in cases involving 
negligence, and so on. Insofar as the agent was not deliberately violating the law 
or a moral norm, they would not have been positioned to conspire to violate it 
with others.
Such pragmatic reasons might be fine in the case of determining how the law 
should function, but do they bear on when and to what extent people are morally 
responsible? This is a large topic I cannot adequately address here, but in my view 
31Mario Rizzo and Frank Arnold, ‘Causal apportionment in the law of torts: an economic theory’, 
Columbia Law Review, 80 (1980), 1399– 429, at p. 1400.
32Ibid., pp. 1399– 400.
33Ibid., p. 1400.
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a plausible account of moral responsibility can and should make sense of the 
relevance of such considerations. Certainly, it would not be surprising if our 
actual moral and legal practices were not shaped by such considerations, since 
practices which ignored perverse incentives would likely be weeded out over 
time. Common- sense judgements may not have the last word on these matters, 
but they do at least have the first word— something J. L. Austin famously said 
about ordinary language. Nor does the approach here imply that individual 
judgements of responsibility can be made on the basis of the utility of holding the 
person responsible. That really would be the wrong kind of reason. Rather, 
pragmatic considerations play a role only at another level, when we are 
determining what the general rules should be. Giving weight to pragmatic 
considerations at this level is not obviously objectionable. Contractualist theories 
like Scanlon’s, and some forms of utilitarianism, make room for such appeals to 
the utility of our practices, while not allowing such appeals within the practice.34 
Modern theories of moral responsibility often make room for pragmatic 
considerations.35
I therefore provisionally conclude that Divisible and Proportional are prima 
facie plausible in cases not involving deliberate wrongdoing. For purposes of the 
argument developed in the preceding sections, this is good news. Most citizens 
who vote do not believe they are acting wrongly, much less know that they are. 
Even if such citizens are, in fact, blameworthy for their voting activities, here we 
typically have something much more like negligence than deliberate wrongdoing. 
For present purposes, then, Divisible and Proportional are as plausible as they 
ever are.
V. CONCLUSION
I will not here try to summarize all the twists and turns of the preceding arguments. 
I take myself to have shown that at least one of the dominant accounts of why 
one ought to vote in massive elections can make sense of the ‘don’t throw your 
vote away’ intuition— an account relevantly like Goldman’s or Sartorio’s. The 
proposed justification of this intuitive idea does not entail that the ‘don’t throw 
your vote away’ argument always carries the day. Its soundness depends on how 
great the gap is between the various candidates, how likely they are to win, and 
on how important (if at all) it is to ‘send a message’. In some cases, it may turn 
out that a voter should vote for a hopeless candidate even given the proposed 
framework. If there is not much to choose between the two main candidates and 
they are both quite bad, then it may well be that the praiseworthiness derived 
from helping to ‘send a message’ to the dominant parties provides a sufficient 
reason to vote for a hopeless but clearly superior candidate.
34See T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: harvard University Press, 
1998). The point about utilitarianism is famously made by John Rawls in his ‘Two concepts of rules’, 
Philosophical Review, 64 (1955), 3– 32.
35See e.g. Manuel Vargas, Building Better Beings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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I view this dependence on such facts as a virtue of the account rather than 
a vice. Ordinary people think there is a substantive debate to be had about the 
legitimacy of voting for such candidates, and that the empirical facts matter, and 
indeed seem intuitively to matter in very much the way the approach laid out 
here predicts it depends on them. Insofar as the account on offer provides a 
useful framework for such debates, but does not prejudge which side must be 
correct in any given election, that is a salutary result. This is an area in which 
the details in any given election should matter; we should resist a theory which 
deals in absolutes. Instead, we should prefer a theory which can explain how 
the reasons cited by reasonable citizens make sense and may have some weight, 
without prejudging which reasons prevail.
The theory developed here does this, while at the same time offering potentially 
practical advice to citizens who are trying to decide how to vote in elections, like 
a US presidential election, where they are tempted by some highly unrealistic 
third- party candidate. They should first figure out which of the theories on offer 
(there may be more than one, as they are not all inconsistent with one another) 
they think best captures their reason(s) to vote in the first place. They should then 
think clearly about how that theory bears on the concern about ‘throwing their 
vote away’. If they endorse an approach like the one defended by Goldman or 
Sartorio, then this worry may have some purchase, but this will depend on the 
relevant empirical facts. In particular, the would- be voter should try to determine 
the expected prima facie culpability associated with each of their possible votes 
and then vote accordingly, unless they think they have countervailing reasons 
(for example, as issuing from the expressive theory) which are even stronger than 
the reasons provided by avoiding complicity in problematic collective actions. 
This will not make the decision of how to vote easy, but then such decisions are 
not easy in any event. The account developed here does at least provide citizens 
with a rational structure within which to conduct their deliberations— hopefully 
a structure which transcends the glib use of slogans and pejoratives which seem 
so easily to dominate discussions of this issue on social media, in conversation, 
editorials, and in well- intentioned ‘get out the vote’ campaign propaganda.
